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Tag Archives | Security

India-Afghanistan Relations: The Way Forward

The iconic short story “Kabuliwallah” by Tagore and the interpretations on the land beyond mountains and imaginations have shaped the India and Afghanistan relations from the past to the present.  “Bound by thousand ties and million memories”, the relations between the two countries go beyond the traditionally state-to-state relations or government. History, culture, civilization and people to people contact have created commonalities thus making the past history the guide to the future.

 

India-Afghanistan

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani paid rich tribute to Indian democracy. India has been admired as the largest pluralistic society in which diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious and sectarian groups coexist and cohabit together. India being the largest secular democracy is in a position to share its know-how and practice with Afghanistan. The nascent egalitarianism society of Afghanistan in all its earnestness looks forward to India for assurance and support in its quest for democracy.

There is a strong economic, politico-strategic and security component in the India-Afghanistan relations. India’s economic assistance and support to democracy is a step to reduce Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan and helps India to establish links with energy rich Central Asia. For India a friendly and pro-active democratic regimes in Afghanistan would act as a balancer in the region. The stability of the region can be assured only if we have a stable Afghanistan which would counter the Taliban forces and India has extended its all out support in this endeavour.

Encountered with deep recession, Afghanistan embarked on several austerity programmes and launched stimulus packages that would help the economy move out of a dependent entity to a self-reliance system.  From Afghan’s standpoint, India’s investments and partnership would be a great value addition in the re-building process of the countries economy and infrastructure. The strategic and security system of Afghanistan is fragile and weak and India’s support and strategic partnership is worthy of mention and a step forward in stabilizing the region. Powers like United States welcomes India as a key player in the stabilization process that agonizes Pakistan, who has adopted a zero-sum approach in the region creating a security dilemma.

Geo-economically Afghanistan is very important for India, the foreign trade policy of India and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), hosts a tremendous promise that could help the country develop economic and strategic importance in Eurasia and Central Asia. The INSTC has particular economic and strategic relevance to India given the increasing regional ambitions of China through its one belt one road initiative. Several MOUs have been signed between India and Afghanistan. Indian investors are interested in the “virgin markets” of Afghanistan. Indian private sectors are seen as a driver towards prosperity in Afghanistan. The other important project is the building of Sister-City relations between major Indian cities and Afghan counterparts. The Sister-City relations will be connected through tourism, faculty exchange programs as well as through private sector investment. Several invitations have been extended to India to invest in Afghanistan.  India has been invited by Afghanistan to join Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan Trade and Transit Agreement a very significant link wherein Afghanistan would act as a land bridge connecting South Asia and central Asia

Termed as one of continuity and engagement, India-Afghanistan relations is built on mutual trust and cooperation. With the exception of the Taliban rule, India’s relations with Afghanistan remain strong. Indian support continues in the reconstruction, rebuilding and stabilization process of Afghanistan.  As the fourth largest donor, Indian contribution to the rebuilding process has been to the effect of US $ 2.2Bn and generous assistance has been provided in the formation of human capital with approximately 13000 Afghan students studying in Indian Universities. India’s signature project and commitment to democracy and institutional support can be seen in the completion of the Afghan Parliament. The Salma dam in Herat is yet another initiative in terms of infrastructure development is nearing completion which would generate 42 MW of much needed power for the electrification of rural and urban Herat and also help in irrigating 80000 hectares of agricultural land. The Trade and transit between India and Afghanistan, is gaining momentum and the movement of trucks across the Attari-Wagha border would spur regional trade and enhance economic engagement in South Asia. There is a ray of positive hope that Pakistan would allow the India-Afghan trade movement, which would boost Afghan economy. Afghanistan is also keen on India’s involvement in the India-Iran Chabhar Port project. The project would create an international transit corridor. The Chabhar Port Project is of enormous significance both to India and Afghanistan. For Afghanistan it would boost the regional trade and for India it would provide a sea-land access to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan.

India is an all weather friend of Afghanistan and continues to play a significant role in tackling terrorism in the region. India has expressed keen intent to strengthen Afghanistan’s defense capabilities for safeguarding its security and combatting all forms of terrorism.  India is supplying helicopters to Afghan government in its effort to combat the growing menace from Taliban. India and Afghanistan have discussed several ways and means to enhance cooperation to combat terrorism. India has spearheaded capacity building prgrammes and training to Afghan soldiers in their effort to tackle terrorism. Several terror network outfits operate from Afghanistan and have expressed this menace as a global phenomenon threatening international peace and stability.

Deep engagement drives India-Afghan relations. There is committed partnership and enduring interest between the world’s largest and fledgling democracy. A pluralistic society with rich tradition and civilization that was undermined by the Taliban forces today is committed to restoring peace and stability in the region. Deeply embedded in democratic principles and values, India’s support in this endeavor of reconstruction of Afghanistan is most sought after. There are set agendas and shared objectives in India-Afghanistan relations. India is keen to assist and build a robust economy and stable political institution in Afghanistan.  An earnest effort in the reconstruction process that is vital for India, as it anchors regional peace and stability.

 

Priya Suresh is a Research Scholar at the Takshashila Institute. She tweets @priyamanassa.

 

 

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Need for a systematic study of defence economics

Ensuring security from external aggression is a basic public good that the governments have to provide and given that it is not possible to reveal individual preferences, this has to be financed from taxes.   The important issue confronted by the policymakers, however, is the basic economic dilemma of scarcity and choice.  The funds allocated for defence are not available for spending on physical infrastructure or human development which are necessary to improve the living conditions of people.

As stated by David Greenwood[1], “What the budgeting system should ideally do is to ensure that the ‘right’ amount is spent on defence in the light of pattern of national priorities, and the ‘right’ military capabilities developed in the light of the structure of security priorities” The answers to what the “right” amount is depends on the economic choices the government has to exercise in providing various public goods, merit goods and services, given the overall resource envelope.

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As the world’s largest democracy, with an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of almost $2 trillion it is imperative to understand what the ‘right’ amount is and to evaluate whether what we are currently spending is high, low, or indeed the ‘right’ amount. While understanding the numbers are important, it is also important to explore the following

  1. various priorities in which defence spending can happen
  2. assessing existing resources
  3. investigating the possibility of developing  normative frameworks to understand security priorities & threat perception
  4. how the defence forces can be effective and yet be fiscally prudent

The national security of a country depends on defence installations and facilities being in the right place, at the right time, with the right qualities and capacities. Spending on defence, therefore, is a resource allocation problem and the budgeting for defence has two broad functions[2]

  1. Management Function — to enable concerned personnel to spend money for various activities in an efficient and economical manner.
  2. Planning Function — Budgetary resources are to be allocated such that it enables achievements regarding operational preparedness and defence capability-building.

Defence budgeting literature indicates that budget is a three-tiered exercise in choice. First, it involves choosing how much to spend on defence, given the resource constrtaint, keeping in view other competing demands. Second, it involves choosing the basis for allocating resources among the services (army, navy and airforce). Third, it involves allocation among various programmes for capability-building, which entails what capabilities to acquire & maintain and the degree of military preparedness to aspire for[3]. Therefore, development of defence economics is necessary from the perspectives of

  • democratic accountability
  • efficiency of resource allocation to ensure preparedness
  • military effectiveness to ensure the right mix of services are deployed to ensure peace
  • improvement of service conditions — that ensures state of the art quality of life of servicemen, ex-servicemen and their families.

Varun Ramachandra is a policy analyst at Takshashila Institution and tweets @_quale

[1] David Greenwood, “Budgeting for Defence”, RUSI, 1972, p8.

[2] AK Ghosh, “ Defence budgeting and planning in India”, p.25

[3] Ibid 27

(Photo License)

PS- My thanks to Nitin Pai and Dr. M. Govinda Rao for their inputs and help.

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Iran Nuclear Framework: What’s the Big Deal?

Key features, sticking points and next steps

By Sumitha Narayanan Kutty

Iran and the P5+1 countries have negotiated a framework agreement and are now one step closer to a nuclear deal that will limit the former’s nuclear programme. This framework, announced after its original deadline of March 30, spells out key parameters that will now be carried forward to the final deal (to be negotiated by June 30).

Contrary to expectations of a vague statement or verbal understanding, the terms that were jointly announced by EU foreign policy chief Frederica Mogherini and Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif were pretty detailed. These parameters have of course been extensively covered by the media and also accessible via a White House fact sheet. Most parameters last ten years, some longer.

Salient Features

  • Iran’s enrichment capacity (number of operating centrifuges) will be cut by half
  • Breakout timeline (currently at 2-3 months) will be increased to one year
  • Arak reactor will be reconfigured, Fordow facility will no longer enrich uranium
  • IAEA Additional Protocol will be implemented, providing greater access to facilities

The next three months focus on the more difficult part of the job – hashing out these technicalities.

Arms control experts seem to agree that the terms address proliferation concerns since the Iranians seem to have agreed to extensive monitoring and verification measures. In addition, the terms (surprising to many) actually favor the United States given the intrusive nature of these inspections.

It is however not surprising that Israel has voiced loud concerns over the ‘bad deal’ though it is interesting to note that the Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, have remained cautiously silent. (US President Barack Obama has invited the latter group – the GCC countries – to Camp David to discuss the deal and assuage serious concerns on regional security.)

Sticking Point(s)

A major sticking point in this final round of talks was sanctions relief. This issue left the P5 delegates particularly divided, with France balking at the idea of quick reversal of UN Security Council Resolutions (sanctions) and Russia opposing the automatic “snapping back” of sanctions if Iran violated any condition.

After Thursday’s announcement, some confusion remains regarding the same. The press release put out by the Iranians seems to gloss over the conditions for reversal of UN sanctions while the White House fact sheet is quite specific on that Iran fulfill its commitments or face immediate penalties for non-compliance. Also, when and how these sanctions would be rolled back will need to be determined once all parties reconvene to hammer out the actual nuclear deal.

(It must be noted here that sanctions levied on Iran for human right violations and its support for international terrorism are not under consideration)

Next Steps

Obviously, the work does not stop here. The road ahead is tough for both the American and Iranian teams with each side now having to present the framework to political opponents and critics at home.

Tehran

The Majlis (parliament) is not required to vote on the agreement. The decision making chain is as follows –

Supreme Leader (SL)

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Supreme National Security Council

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Zarif and co)

Zarif has been in constant consultation with the SL and proceeded with the presser in Lausanne only after Khamenei’s thumb’s up. However, the possibility that Khamenei backs out as technicalities are further discussed cannot be ruled out.

Washington DC

Obama has already briefed the Congress leadership on the deal and his administration will continue to reach out to members through next week. Reports on this initial briefing seem to convey a sense of appreciation for the robustness of the framework, even from Republican members.

Obama has previously made it clear that he will veto any new sanctions (including most recent Corker legislation) that may damage the negotiations. Given the new framework, there is hope Congress will not undercut but give space for negotiations until June.

If Congressional oversight seems impossible, Obama will forge an executive agreement. Perhaps quite fitting.

It took an executive agreement for the United States to get out of Iran (the release of embassy hostages in 1981). It could take another (in a sense) to get back in.

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty is a Scholar at The Takshashila Institution.

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How India made its mark in Sudan and South Sudan

The breakout of ethnic violence in South Sudan over the past month has seen hundreds of civilians killed. Yesterday, two Indian soldiers serving in in the country as part of the United Nation’s peacekeeping force died after their base was ambushed by rebels. New Delhi has close relations with Juba, and much before its independence, had impeccable and historic relations with Khartoum. Sudan was India’s first oil and gas homerun abroad.

In the mid-1990s, India seriously started mooting investing in the energy sector abroad as its newly liberalised economy and its new designers realised that for successful and uninterrupted economic growth for a country of this size, it was vital to organise uninterrupted supply of fuel.

Prior to this India, which has always been a net importer of crude, had invested in Russia which provided more than favourable conditions.  Now, things were changing and decision making on the issue at the Prime Minister’s Office was changing. One of the earliest signs of India’s intensions for overseas investments in oil and gas came with the then much publicised idea of the Central Asia Gas Pipeline Project (CAGPP), an idea first put forward by the company Bridas from Argentina. Indian diplomats at the time in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, had started pressurising the Indian government to seriously look into the prospects of bringing natural gas from central Asia into India, but avoiding Afghanistan and Pakistan. Alternates included building pipelines through parts of China.

As politics over the central Asian pipeline continues even today, in 2013, India’s plans to invest in energy assets abroad took it elsewhere. Africa is a continent rich in natural resources and while not much of Western interest prevailed there in the 1990s, due to various reasons, the developing world started to look at the continent as a viable and comparatively economical region to invest in.

However, there was considerable dissent within the multi-layered political circles on Delhi whether India should invest in assets such as these abroad or not, specifically in Africa. Such an investment was unprecedented in a post-90s India and possibility of this happening, while challenging, was eventually unavoidable.

When BJP’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Prime Minister in 1998, Indian oil and gas sector started to work towards applying (previously failed) pressure on the Prime Minister’s Office to start investing in energy assets abroad. During lobbying for this, many involved from the industry realised that some of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Cabinet ministers were dead against investing in a project in Sudan. ONGC Videsh (OVL) had already managed to win the country’s first big foreign energy project in Russia’s Sakhalin-1 field in 2001. However, Sudan was a different, challenging, risky and unconventional bid.

One of the main reasons why powerful people such as Arun Shourie and the late Pramod Mahajan were advising Vajpayee against this “adventure” was the fact the stake India was looking to buy also involved China. This was looked upon as against India’s national interest within the cabinet and the trust factor with Beijing was not the strongest, making it a risky venture.

Ram Naik, who was the Oil Minister at the time, was spearheading these acquisitions knowing that Vajpayee was interested in this direction. Bureaucrats, oilmen and others including ministers had managed to correctly guide Naik in accepting that these bids are necessities and not luxuries. The dissent, nonetheless, continued within the cabinet. It is known that Mahajan had said: “hum gareeb desh hain. Sudan mein itna paisa lagane ki kya zaroorat hai? (we are a poor country, why do we need to put so much money in Sudan?). Arun Shourie reportedly added weight to Mahajan’s views.

However, Vajpayee and now L K Advani, who had gotten involved, were not convinced by Mahajan’s apprehensions. A meeting was organised where bureaucrats and oil industry leaders were called in to offer further convince the cabinet. By this time, the people gunning for the Sudan deal had managed to get some newspapers to back the bid, with articles favouring the deal. However, not many made it into print since time was limited. Multiple copies were printed of these few articles which were then taken into the meeting and presented as though many articles backing the bid had been published across the spectrum of the print media.

The oil industry also highlighted the fact that India had invested over $1 billion in the Sakhalin-1 project in Russia successfully. This was presented as another feather in the cap of Oil Minister Ram Naik’s accomplishments. After listening to all the details including both Mahajan and Shourie making their concerns known assertively, Vajpayee decided to overrule all opposing viewpoints after L K Advani convinced him that the deal should go ahead along with risk insurance, which was organised by a British bank. He (Vajpayee) gave ONGC Videsh a historic unconditional nod for the deal.

India went ahead and bought 25% stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) from Canadian major Talisman Energy for a staggering sum of $750 million in 2003. The China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) owns 40 per cent in GNPOC, Petronas of Malaysia has 30 per cent and the Sudanese national oil company 5 per cent.

This successful deal, passed thanks to political foresight and smart and intense lobbying by both diplomats and oil industry leaders, opened in a way many doors for other Indian businesses to grow in Africa. Even after the carving out of South Sudan from Sudan, New Delhi has managed to keep close relations with both Juba and Khartoum, even though the near war conditions between the two states do keep India’s Foreign Ministry on its toes. Last year, India had invited high level delegations from both countries to try and ease the tensions.

A lot of the troubles between Sudan and South Sudan have occurred due to the new international border separating them. Most of the rich oil and gas regions are around the border and the basins in the region are now shared by both countries. For many months Sudan had blocked routes for South Sudan, a land-locked country, to export its oil as the pipeline required for this runs via Sudan. Juba, as a response, asked India to come and build a new pipeline via Kenya, hence bypassing its problem in dealing with Khartoum and restoring its crucial funds received from oil and gas. However, India till now has not accepted due to concerns on both political (angering Khartoum which could have then got closer to China) and economic (cost of the project and the transit fees due to Kenya would have been too high).

Both Sudan and South Sudan are great examples of governance with vision, which managed to get both in the bigger business of owning energy assets abroad and getting a good foot hold in Africa, a continent on the cusp of an economic boom.

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