Tag Archives | India

The South-South Divergence on Global Environmental Regulations

By Ratish Srivastava (@socilia13)

Historically, developing and emerging economies have participated in international negotiations but with time, the alliance has been strained, particularly between India and China.

What does the developing world want?

The developing world is diverse in terms of development, capacity of domestic government and power at the negotiation table in international conferences. The developing world only accepts these regulations as long as the developed world provides the technology and finance mechanism to make this change easier. They also try to make changes in the deal, which could help them cope up with the effect of regulations, for instance, a deal that requires them to reduce the intensity of emissions rather than absolute reductions.

India’s position – Less ambitious domestic climate policy (compared to China), commitment to reduction in intensity of emissions rather than absolute reduction.

China’s position – Enacted various domestic policies, including an emissions trading system.

Shift from North-South Divergence

The North-South are fluid categories that change between unity and polarity. This divide is used by the developing world as a tool for negotiation. The developed world is already industrialised without any regulations on emissions, and these regulations imposed on the developing world hinders the development process.

The North-South divide fails to understand the heterogeneity in the southern countries. The development status and the demand for resources (coal in this case) creates new groups and a complex blend of current and historic emitters at the negotiation table.

Divergence

How the divergence happened?

In the early 2000’s, a global mercury negotiation was held through the UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) Governing Council and Global Ministerial Environmental Forum. This event created a large Southern coalition (G77 plus China).

However, as negotiators considered a legally binding agreement, countries formed regional groups like GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries and the African Group). The two largest emitters, India and China formed an alliance, where economic development increased emissions. Cooperation from China and India was important to address the problem of mercury emissions. According to them, the task of nation building is difficult to continue with environmental regulations for an important energy resource like coal.

India and China resisted the regulatory action, moving the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process for almost a decade. The cooperation lasted until the fifth INC, where China changed its stance completely, and were willing to accept a more stringent measure to cut down on emissions. China reached an agreement, and their decision to cooperate allowed them to play a major role in creating the final text for the negotiation. In the Minamata Convention 2013, China signed the treaty, stressing on their domestic policy measures to address mercury pollution. They adopted the same control standards as Germany, which are considerably high. On the other hand, India did not attend the convention and only signed in 2014 after a change in government. India was criticised by NGO’s for its lack of concern to address the issue with mercury emissions.

The growing divergence arises due to developmental constraints, technological capabilities and in this case, it was China’s aim to meet its domestic climate goals. China, at the time of the conference was consuming nearly half of the global coal. However, it reduced its consumption and installed more non-coal sources, which explains the shift in the fifth INC from its original stance, which also directly targets mercury emissions. India continues to invest in coal, as it plans to expand coal consumption by 2022.

The developing countries with different interests are unlikely now to form coalitions as they look to meet their own domestic climate objectives. Coalitions will form depending upon what resource it is, how much of it is used for fuelling development by the country and the domestic climate policies. This will end up creating a complex blend of current and historical emitters.

Ratish is a research intern (@socilia13) at the Takshashila Institution

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Exploring Mongolia’s balancing behaviour

In the near future, it’s unlikely that Mongolia will position itself as one of the allies in India’s efforts to balance out Chinese influence | by Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)

Mongolia’s supposed volte-face has attracted the attention of India’s strategic community in the last few days. A simplified sequence of events is as follows: In May 2015, Mr Modi made a trip to Mongolia, the first ever by an Indian Prime Minister to that country. The most substantial outcome for Mongolia from this visit was the announcement of a $1 billion line of credit. Notably, the $1 billion amount is the second largest credit line issued by the Government of India, since the inception of this assistance programme in 2003-04. This was followed the Dalai Lama’s ninth visit to Mongolia in November 2016 (the last planned visit in August 2014 was cancelled by Mongolian authorities because President Xi was to set foot there on the same dates). China unsurprisingly objected to the November visit: it closed down a key border crossing between the two countries and cut-off talks on providing a $4.2 billion debt to Mongolia. Soon enough, the Mongolian Foreign Minister was made to publicly apologise for permitting the visit. He went on to say that the Dalai Lama will not be allowed to visit Mongolia under the current administration henceforth.

China’s official response to the events was sullen — an approach that has come to characterise its relations with most of its neighbours. The Chinese Foreign Affairs Spokesperson said:

we hope that Mongolia will truly learn lessons from this incident, truly respect the core interests of China, honour its promise and make efforts to improve the relations between China and Mongolia.” In turn, the Mongolian ambassador to India on called on India to extend support in this moment of crisis.

Now, because of the India angle to this story, some analysts pointed out that India’s inability in extending sufficient help was to blame Mongolia’s spectacular capitulation. Accurate or not, this assessment leads us to the following questions: what does this turnaround say about Mongolia’s capacity to challenge China? And, can Mongolia ever demonstrate balancing behaviour and ally with states such as India in countering China? On examining the recent turn of events closely, two possibilities come forth.

The first possibility: it was Mongolia that initially sensed an opportunity — a visit by the Dalai Lama could signal that his reincarnation could appear in Mongolia. Hence, the Mongolian government permitted the visit, albeit one strictly classified as that of a ‘religious nature’ alone. But when the Chinese stick came down with all its might, Mongolia quickly retracted.

Mongolia has played this game before — this was the Dalai Lama’s ninth visit to the country since 1979 and on each occasion, the Chinese response has been unkind. In 2002, China retaliated by closing the border rail crossing for two days, isolating the land-locked country further. The response in 2011 was milder — a ‘stern representation’ was made to convey Beijing’s displeasure at Ulan Bator. With this history in mind, it is difficult to believe that Mongolia permitted the trip without expecting a pushback from China.

The second possibility: India was, either a failsafe option that Mongolia presumed it could revert to in case the Chinese retaliated, or was the one that abetted the Dalai Lama’s visit. In either case, this possibility relies on a perception that Mongolia can be a balancing power — ready to join hands with weaker sides such as India to challenge the regional hegemon.

If this was indeed the intent from the Indian side, we’re on the right track. However, the same cannot be said about the instrument used. It would take a lot more than a mere increase in Line of Credit (LoC) to get a land-locked country — one that is struggling with a ‘$1 billion budget gap and looming debt repayments’ — on your side. A Line of Credit — whatever the amount extended may be — count merely as an attempt that can at best marginally change incentives of the recipient country. Projects undertaken as part of LoCs come with riders — 75% of the value of the contracts must be sourced from India. And the utilisation rates of LoCs are often slow, because of supply side constraints (read incompetence of Indian exporters) or because of demand issues (read inadequacies of recipient nation’s importers). [Data on lines of credit available in this xls sheet from the EXIM bank website.] 

Probably, the truth lies somewhere in between both the possibilities. What is clear is that China’s response this time around was swift and unforgiving, in continuance of China’s aggressive stance against its neighbours under President Xi. And it came at a time when Mongolia is already struggling economically. Under such circumstances, can Mongolia be one of the allies in India’s project of balancing out Chinese influence in the near future? Can, for instance, Mongolia take the risk of allowing the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama to appear in Mongolia?

Very unlikely, especially if India is unwilling to think beyond Lines of Credit. If India is seriously considering challenging China, that demands it to offer something that can drastically change its partners’ incentives. Perhaps it is time to consider options such as offering unconditional development (if not military aid), or investing in long term developmental projects (like CPEC, minus all the Chinese characteristics) to bolster the capacities of smaller states in China’s neighbourhood. And even that wouldn’t guarantee the balancing credentials of states such as Mongolia, too low on the national power scale to inflict pain to China. Perhaps, a better balancing strategy for India would be to consolidate relations with Vietnam — a country that has the credentials to take the fight to the Chinese in alliance with partners such as India.

Also read: my piece on how India’s Lines of Credit stack up.

Pranay Kotasthane is a Research Fellow at The Takshashila Institution. He is on twitter @pranaykotas

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Data story: Lines of Credit supported by India

A brief overview of India’s lines of Credit to other nation-states

by Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)

India’s relationship with Mongolia has been in the news recently. After the Dalai Lama visited the Buddhist country, China suspended ongoing talks to grant a $4.2 billion loan and made Mongolia’s Foreign Minister apologise for permitting the visit. When Mongolia’s ambassador urged India to raise it’s voice against the Chinese overreaction, India’s response was as follows:

We are closely working with the Mongolian government to implement the credit line in a manner that is deemed beneficial to the friendly people of Mongolia by its leadership. We are aware of the difficult budgetary situation that Mongolia is facing due to various factors including high cost of servicing of debt raised by them in the past.

The credit line being referred to was the US $1 billion committed to Mongolia during PM Modi’s visit in May 2015. Meant to finance the ‘development of railways and related infrastructure projects’, this was the second-largest single line of credit by India since the programme started in 2003-04. This data point got me interested in this creature called Line of Credit. This post gives a basic overview of India’s Lines of Credit.

What is a Line of Credit?
A LOC is a ‘soft loan’ (not a grant) provided at concessional interest rates to developing countries and has to be repaid by the borrowing government. Besides serving the foreign policy aim of increasing India’s presence in critical geographies, LOCs are meant to promote exports of Indian goods and services — they come with a conditionality that a minimum of 75% of the contract value must be sourced from India.

One important factor to consider while looking at LOC figures is that the utilisation rates are typically low (the mean utilisation rate currently stands at 42%).  There are primarily two reasons: one, demand side issues such as inadequacies of recipient nation’s importers, insecure conditions, or lack of statutory clearances by the recipient government. Two, because of supply-side issues such as incompetence of Indian exporters, customs restrictions,  or lack of clearances from the Indian government.

Because a LOC is a soft loan (not a grant) and suffers from slow utilisation, regardless of the size of the amount approved as part of a LOC, it merely counts as an attempt to change the recipient country’s incentives at the margin. Which means, if a country is extremely critical to India’s national interest, it would require the government to do a lot more than announce billions of dollars worth of credit lines. Especially because China can match any LOC figure that the Indian government attempts — a direct outcome of continuous economic growth.

 

Nevertheless, how do India’s LOCs stack up? The summary is in the image below (click to expand the image). The data used to create these infographics can be downloaded from here.
locs

Also read: My colleague Pavan’s excellent Pragati Infographic: Foreign Aid going out of India.

Pranay Kotasthane is a Research Fellow at The Takshashila Institution. He is on twitter @pranaykotas

 

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The disappearance of the middle ground

By Anupam Manur (@anupammanur)

The end result of an acrid political climate, as witnessed in the US and India, could be one of highly populated extremes and a disappearing middle-ground.

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Dear America,

Allow me the liberty to predict what will happen over the next few years. This is not another fear-mongering doomsday scenario painting exercise about the potential consequences of a Trump Presidency. I’ll leave that to the experts; experts, who have gotten all their predictions wrong until now. You are in a lot of trouble, not because of what Trump will do or not do, but because of the way you will react to his every move.

If you thought the election campaign trail saw the heights of polarisation, bigotry and racism in your society, then, you have another thing coming. Things are only going to get more divisive from now on. There will be an exponential increase in nationalistic fervour. Public discourse will worsen over the next few years to the point that sensible people will be forced to retire out of sheer frustration and saturation. This is the adverse selection problem in public discourse. If there is a higher proportion of lemons in the market, and the average consumer cannot differentiate between the lemon and the peach, the peaches get crowded out.

Every move by your next President will receive disproportionate attention and reactions. Yes, in a democracy, the citizens have to provide the vigil, but this will take an extreme turn, and perhaps a turn for the worse. The vigil will turn into an obsession, which will saturate public attention. The supporters and detractors will fight out every move, not based on the merits or demerits of the move, but based on the position they took on the day of the election. Supporters will cheer every move and defend it with all their might, irrespective of whether there exists any merits to it. Even terrible moves that might actually induce harm in these stakeholders will find staunch supporters. The supporters might even be willing to endure the negative effects in order to defend their position.

Detractors, on the other hand, will assume that it is their moral obligation to oppose everything. Let us assume that Trump does something reasonable in his tenure, which can be welfare enhancing to Americans, like perhaps fixing the fragile Obamacare. Regardless, the detractors will vilify him, make highly polemical arguments, and go to great lengths to find faults, instead of nuanced debates on how it can be improved. Reasonability and sensibility will disappear from public discourse and so will balanced objectivity. The residue will be a highly charged, hyper-partisan platform for dogmatic exchanges. To make things worse, your political representatives will also be highly divided and it would be reasonable to expect the Congress and the Senate to be in a continuous gridlock for the next few years. Sure, some legislations may get passed, but most of it will have to endure an extremely rough path.

This black hole of negativity will suck in everything in its sight. Previously sane commentators will start taking positions and will stick to it, even in the face of contradictory evidence. Very few will be exempt from this. The middle ground will rapidly vanish and the extremes will start getting populated. There is perhaps some merit in apathy and indecisiveness among citizens, but the time for that has gone. Everyone has a strong opinion and of course, it is the right opinion. The media houses will not be spared either from the hyper-partisan discourse. An independent and impartial media will be left wanting.

I speak from experience. This is what has happened to public discourse in India since the elections in 2014. I am not trying to draw any parallels between our two elected representatives nor our political parties or governments. There is just an overwhelming similarity in the acrid political climate of our countries and the end result could be one of highly populated extremes and a disappearing middle-ground.

Anupam Manur is a Policy Analyst at the Takshashila Institution

 

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GST Bill: A Successful Exercise of Consensus-Building in Democracy

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Image courtesy of The Indian Express

Bhavani Castro is a Fellow of Indian Studies, Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo

The first half of 2016 was marked by several setbacks for democratic institutions and liberal values all over the world. From the Turkish government’s repressive response after the failed military coup to the rise of radical parties in Europe, a controversial impeachment process in Brazil and the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, it seems that democracy has recently been under significant pressure. Intense animosity and partisan divisions are challenging the way democracy works and its core values, undermining decision-making processes in parliaments, blocking key reforms, and leading to authoritarian administrative measures. However, in the midst of many worrying examples of flaws in democratic regimes in different parts of the world, it is possible to identify one case of significant success when it comes to democracy’s capacity to overcome division and build consensus: the passage of a groundbreaking tax reform by the Indian Parliament.

Goods and Services Tax Bill (GST) was passed in August in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha, and approved by President Pranab Mukherjee on 8 September. The GST, now turned into law, creates a single tax system in India, and represents a significant breakthrough that in practice will transform the Indian states into a common market. This notable success generated little reaction in the international media, especially in emerging and developing countries; however, it holds important lessons on how game-changing reforms can be implemented in a democracy.

The world should look at the ratification of the GST law as a substantial example for effective democracy for a variety of reasons. First, it shows the capacity of a messy, multiparty parliamentary system. Since the 1990s, the Indian government needs to recur to coalitions to rule at the national level, as the increasing number of national and state parties make it impossible for a single party to rule alone. This means often making deals and negotiating not only with the opposition, but also with strong regional parties that seek policies that benefit only – or mostly – their local constituencies. Similar phenomena are visible in other large democracies like Brazil, where large coalitions make governing extremely difficult.

An increase in polarization usually means fewer laws pass in Parliament. For emerging countries like India, where there is a necessity of progressive reforms to manage the economic transformation and push for social improvements, political fragmentation and a lack of consensus building can have devastating effects. To avoid setbacks, the strategy adopted by the Indian government was to engage and include strong regional parties in the discussion, rather than coercing and embracing a combative tone. At the same time, the biggest opponent, the Congress Party, was slowly isolated and eventually, faced by the risk of having its image damaged, had to accept the bill and enter the negotiation. Consequently, opposition parties contributed to changes in the bill, while the ruling coalition yielded to demands and offered concessions in the final written version. The process was not simply an exchange of favours as it is usually observed in multiparty democracies, but instead a conciliatory process of political commitment by all parties involved.

Moreover, the GST, when implemented, will go against an ongoing international trend of isolating peoples and markets – the new tax system has even been called a “reverse Brexit”. While the European Union is going through one of its biggest crises – with rise in partisanship and the exit of an important economic member – India is showing the world that democracies can do better. The new tax system will replace dozens of different tariffs that made selling a product to another Indian state as hard as selling products abroad. That means connecting 1.2 billion people in a European-style market and an expected increase of 1-2 per cent to the country’s GDP growth rate.

Finally, it is important to consider the dimension of this tax reform. The GST was designed along the lines of the value-added tax (VAT) model from OECD countries, and it is considered a key reform for restructuring economies. For India, it is one of the biggest institutional reforms since its independence in 1947. Most countries still struggle to enact legislation that will lead to this type of revolutionary work, as it can negatively affect some industry sectors and interest groups. Brazil, another populous democracy, has been trying for years to design a tax reform to substitute its inefficient system; however, it never even managed to produce an initial project for a new tax scheme. India’s lessons on the GST law-making process could be extremely valuable for countries like Brazil, which could follow India’s steps: first creating a highly skilled committee to design a uniform tax system, and then submitting the initial proposal to the legislative for a comprehensive discussion and adjustments between all political parties.

India still faces many problems threatening its democracy, including an ongoing civil upsurge in Kashmir, suppressed by the government, and a severe water-sharing dispute that increases tensions between southern states. However, in the case of the GST process, the government proved that it is possible to use democracy as a tool to reach potentially painful but necessary reforms in a pluralistic country. It took more than a decade to pass the GST Bill, but democracy is a slow process and does not provide fast solutions to urgent problems. India’s political system can be inefficient, polarized, disorganized and sometimes exhausting, but hopefully this experience will be a positive example for other democratic countries still struggling with much-needed institutional reforms.

Bhavani Castro is a Fellow of Indian Studies, Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo

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SAARC: A Sunk Cost

Following the Uri Attacks, the 19th SAARC Summit that was due to take place on the 15th and 16th of November has been postponed. India refused to attend the summit, placing the blame on cross border terrorism perpetrated by a single country. Soon, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan also chose to opt out of the summit meeting which was due to take place next month. Pakistan placed the blame on India for derailing processes of regional cooperation and reiterated its commitment to the SAARC charter. For now however, the seven heads of South Asia will not be meeting until India and Pakistan have simmered down tensions.

The Indian media has been quick to attribute the postponement of the SAARC meeting to the success of Modi’s diplomacy. However, SAARC meetings have always been susceptible to bilateral tensions. While the group is supposed to meet annually, it concedes that the regional organisation meets only once in a year and a half or so. No wonder SAARC’s initiatives have been characterised by failure: the countries cannot fulfill commitments to meet but intermittently.

The first time the SAARC Summit was derailed was in 1989 when Sri Lanka protested against the delay of the IPKF’s withdrawal from the country. The 7th Summit in 1992 was pushed by a year because of the Babri Masjid riots. A year later, India-Pakistan contentions impacted SAARC processes and the 8th Summit was pushed to 1995. The period between 1998 and 2003 saw repeated postponement of the 11th Summit because of a number of low intensity conflicts between India and Pakistan (from the Kargil War in 1999 to the Parliament Attacks of 2001). The 12th Summit was derailed because of the coup in Nepal and the Dhaka bombings.  After the 26/11 Attacks, the summit was again pushed by a year because of contentions between India and Pakistan. 2012 Summit

The postponement of the SAARC Summit is not a victory of Indian diplomacy but a feature of the SAARC mechanism. Unlike organisations like the ASEAN which have managed to keep channels of communication open even during times of conflict, SAARC’s history remains intertwined with the Indo-Pak power politics. It is unable to accomodate power dynamics of the region and allows for bilateral contentions to easily derail any processes. Even if the SAARC summit had taken place, what would have the result been? SAFTA is dead while the South Asian Economic Union is a pipe dream; regional trade remains at a meagre percentage.

At the 2014 Kathmandu Summit, hullabaloo was created about the launch of a SAARC satellite and cooperation of forces to deal with disasters. The Kathmandu Summit had taken place in the first year of the Modi rajya and there was much talk of the neighbourhood gaining importance- a move indicated by Modi’s unprecedented invitation to the heads of South Asian States to attend his swearing in ceremony. Two years later, bilateral ties between India and the remainder of the South Asian states (the case of Pakistan is debateable) are definitely on the upswing, however, the SAARC remains as ineffective as it has always been.

India needs to acknowledge that this multilateral initiative is not a success and direct its attentions towards the external neighbourhood. It needs to de-hyphenate itself from being merely a South Asian power and look at a larger region such as the Indo-Pacific. India is gradually improving ties with countries in South-East Asia and West Asia, which is the way to go. Maybe it is time to recognise that SAARC is a sunk cost and invest those resources in a more fruitful venture under the larger Asian security architecture.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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Book Review: Not War, Not Peace?

by Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)

[An edited version of this review first appeared in The Business Standard Newspaper on 4th October 2016]

A lucid and comprehensive account of India’s strategic predicament in countering Pakistan-backed terrorism

Not War, Not Peace? — Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism
Authors: George Perkovich and Toby Dalton
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Pages: 297
Price: INR 695

‘Prescient’ would be an underwhelming adjective to describe a book that claims to be “the first comprehensive assessment of the violent and non-violent options available to India for compelling Pakistan to take concrete steps towards curbing terrorism originating from its homeland”. The timing of this publication can perhaps be compared only to the timing of Virat Kohli’s strokeplay.

In this book, the authors George Perkovich and Toby Dalton (both from the DC based think tank — Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) provide some much-needed clarity to questions such as: how should India respond to Pakistan’s usage of sub-conventional warfare? and what are the costs and benefits for each of India’s options?

As a piece of analytical writing, the book avoids the trap of a recency bias—excessive jingoism calling for retribution in response to terrorist attacks such as Uri can lead to an error in decision-making, hurting India in the long run. Instead, the authors identify four objectives for any response by the Indian side to an act of terror: one, satisfying the domestic political—psychological need to punish the perpetrators; two, motivating Pakistani authorities to prevent the next attack; three, deterring Pakistani authorities from escalating the conflict in reaction to India’s punitive moves; and four, ending the conflict in ways that doesn’t leave India worse off than it would have been, had it responded with less destructive means.

With these objectives as the backdrop, the authors describe five strategies: a proactive strategy not very different from the surgical strikes deployed in the aftermath of the Uri attacks, limited airborne strike on terrorist targets in Pakistan, covert operations to take out terrorists and their infrastructure, a change in India’s nuclear force posture allowing India to punish Pakistan in ways currently unfeasible, and finally, non-violent methods involving alliances with other states to inflict costs on Pakistan.

The book proceeds in a structured manner: each chapter picks up one strategy and then assesses what the likely next steps on the escalation ladder could be. Authors also identify the benefits and costs of each stage of escalation. To borrow a computer programming terminology, the book picks up an option and passes it through several “nested, if then else loops” systematically.

Some other highlights of the book. One, the book is severely damning of the “tendency in India, verging on standard operating procedure to announce or publicly discuss operational concepts or weapon systems before they actually exist.” We have seen glimpses of this tendency recently as well: whether it was the case of the PM raising Balochistan in the Independence Day speech, the case of a possible review of the Indus Water Treaty or DRDO’s claims on programmes such as ballistic missile defence systems. Premature sabre-rattling without credible capacity only motivates the irreconcilable entities in Pakistan, while India is caught off-guard when these forces retaliate.

Two, the book incriminates the below par performance of India’s military-industrial complex, saying that this lacuna constrains many of India’s military options. Three, the two authors’ assessment of the US role in Pakistan is also noteworthy. They accurately cite that even today, the US remains Pakistan’s biggest export market and a substantially large provider of economic and military aid. Getting the US to stop supporting Pakistan, financially and militarily, still remains an unfulfilled task.

A few sections in the book however, are based on long disproved assumptions. For instance, the first chapter derives that India’s position with respect to Pakistan is undermined, at least partly, due to a lack of “strategic culture”. The proof for this claim are statements by retired and serving defence officers, who place the blame on political leaderships through the years. In any case, this strategic culture fallacy doesn’t hold water. Just because India’s strategic aims were not Alexander-like in nature does not imply that there was no strategic culture. In fact, India’s strategic aim for long has been the consolidation of markets and states in the subcontinent. The chapter does make a redeeming point: the lack of a “defence economics” practice in India. Questions such as — how much and on what basis should be spent on its defence? Would the armed forces agree to a reduction in manpower in favour of better hardware? — still remained unasked and unanswered.

The authors are excessively charitable towards Pakistan when they criticise Pakistan for its “unwillingness or inability to prevent cross border terrorism against India”. After all, Pakistan has been directly involved in several cases of cross-border terrorism. The “rogue actor” model, often used to bury this unsettling fact can’t explain the following: how is it that there is a high substitutability of labour between the army and the jihadi groups, and between jihadi groups themselves? And what explains the fact that any efforts of peace talks between Pakistan and India are promptly followed by acts of violence, terror and intimidation from and within Pakistan?

Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two. The first is a putative state; currently represented by a civilian government. The second entity is not just the military, as it is generally held. Instead, it is the the military—jihadi complex (MJC): a dynamic syndicate of military, militant, radical Islamist and political-economic structures that pursues a set of domestic and foreign policies to ensure its own survival and relative dominance. Policies towards Pakistan will continue to be ineffective unless these two Pakistans are explicated and internalised.

The book also claims that “today and in the foreseeable future, the choice Indian leaders will face is between doing nothing and doing too much.” Perhaps, there is a space for a third option: Ignore Pakistan while building up defences, resolving the political issues in Jammu & Kashmir, and shaping international morality against states that support terrorism as a policy.

Finally, Not War, Not Peace is a must-read for anyone interested in the India—Pakistan protracted conflict. Long-time Pakistan watchers will enjoy the exhaustive nature of the analyses while new readers will find the language easy enough to grasp. One final regret: such a comprehensive and lucid assessment of India’s options was written first by experts in the US, and not in India.   

Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas) is a Research Fellow at the Takshashila Institution.

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Countering the two Pakistans

by Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)

Summary of an interview I gave to Channel News Asia.

The Indian Army claimed that it conducted surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to pre-empt another infiltration by terrorists. Before we discuss the impact of this claim, it is important to analyse the antecedents. Else, we’ll be falling into the trap of recency bias which makes us react emotionally to the most recent events on the ground.

The current Indian government, much like the earlier Indian governments, started off with the vision that normalising the relationship with the Pakistani civilian establishment provides the best chance for peace in the region. Consequently, Nawaz Sharif was invited to the Indian PM’s swearing-in ceremony. Subsequently, the Indian PM also made a trip to Lahore in continuation of this policy. However, all this outreach ended with first, the attack on a bus and police station in Gurdaspur and then an attack on the Pathankot air base. More recently, the terrorists attacked the Indian army brigade headquarters in Uri. This cycle—rounds of talks ending up in retaliation coming from Pakistan has a long history. Hence we’ve previously advocated that:

it is futile to spend cycles on trying to engage Pakistan at all costs.  And that, only by developing and putting in place mitigation strategies can India truly hope to better insulate itself from the terror infrastructure that operates out of Pakistan [Discussion document: Sustained Dialogue Process as India’s Pakistan Policy].

Given that normalising the relationship with the Pakistani civilian government has higher costs than benefits, India was on the lookout for stronger options after the attack in Uri. And hence the attack on terrorist “launchpads” across the border. One needs to remember that this attack was not against the Pakistani Army or the Pakistani people. It was explicitly targeted towards terrorist infrastructure. Moreover, the Indian Army claimed responsibility for the attack and conveyed that there are no intentions to carry on with further strikes.

Pakistan’s response
Pakistani news agencies have been denying that there was a “surgical strike” and tried to play it down as cross-border fire. The terminology doesn’t matter. What is significant is that this was perhaps the first time that the Indian army openly claimed that it had struck down terrorist camps on the other side of the LoC. Even though tactical operations across the border from both sides aren’t new, this explicit claim is meant to blow the lid off the lie that Pakistan has been peddling throughout the world: any Indian response against a terror strike will eventually lead to nuclear war.

India’s claim and Pakistan’s subsequent dithering shows that there are options for India to explore below the nuclear threshold. There will be pressure on the Pakistani military establishment to retaliate and we might see some firing on the LoC in the days to come. But if Pakistan chooses to escalate in response to an attack on terrorists, it will only provide further evidence to how the army and the militants operate in unison and are in fact a part of an organisational structure— a complex.

What about the diplomatic responses?
Diplomatic responses (like refusing to attend the SAARC meeting) and military responses are not mutually exclusive to each other. In fact, since Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two—the first a putative civilian state and the second a military-jihadi complex—two responses are needed to counter the two Pakistans.

The diplomatic responses are meant to address the Pakistani people and the Pakistani putative state. They are meant to convey that the costs of supporting terrorists far outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, the overt military strike is meant to convey to the military-jihadi complex that India has options to strike back and that “tactical” nuclear weapons cannot be used as an excuse to target Indian people and the Republic of India.

Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas) is a Research Fellow at the Takshashila Institution.

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Look out for MJC’s reaction to India’s changed articulation on Balochistan

India must be prepared for two responses — one from the MJC and one from the putative state of Pakistan

by Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)

For the first time in many years, focus of the India—Pakistan discussion has veered from the familiar topics—Kashmir and cross-border terrorism originating in Pakistan—to Balochistan. After PM Modi’s reference to “the people of Balochistan” in his 2016 Independence Day speech, two immediate effects are clearly observable: one, the Baloch nationalists dispersed across the world have received greater attention from a completely new set of audiences. This has added much-needed vigour to their waning campaign against the atrocities committed by the Pakistani state in Balochistan. On the other hand, the intensification of the rhetoric has been met with one of the most brutal crackdowns by the Pakistani establishment within Balochistan—67 were killed and over 150 were reported missing in August alone.

The idea behind this post is not to gauge the wisdom or the folly behind the PM’s statement on Balochistan for such an exercise is futile.  Given that the wheels have already been set into motion, it would be worthwhile to ask: how will Pakistan react to this escalation from India?

To understand Pakistan’s reaction, it is critical to note that there will be two different responses because Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two. The first is a putative state; currently represented by a civilian government and a civilian de-facto head of state, having its own flag and other paraphernalia that make it appear like a sovereign state. The competing entity is not just the military, as it is generally held. Instead, it is a dynamic syndicate of military, militant, radical Islamist and political-economic structures, which pursues a set of domestic and foreign policies to ensure its own survival and relative dominance: what we call the military—jihadi complex (MJC).

The MJC and the putative state of Pakistan, both will react differently to India, depending on their own capabilities and intentions. My colleague Nitin Pai explains this duality of response through this analogy:

So when New Delhi engages Pakistan, it is like one batsman against two bowlers bowling simultaneously. Just when you think you’ve played a great shot—a solid defensive one or a flashy hit over the bowler’s head—you realise that you’ve been bowled by the other bowler before you’ve finished your follow- through. The doppelgänger is always there, even if you declare you aren’t going to face him. Even if you ignore him. Even if, as it turns out, you accept that he is a part of the bowling team.

Thus, India must be prepared for two responses — one from the MJC and one from the putative state of Pakistan.

First, let’s see the response of the putative state: there are hardly any new tools in Nawaz Sharif’s retaliation bag. The first response will be: Kashmir. At international forums and at bilateral diplomatic meetings, the Pakistani state will try to make the Kashmir issue central to any discussion on India and Pakistan, once again. Internally, it might consider conceding some grounds to Baloch nationalist demands in order to negate the negative propaganda. CPEC will again be posed as a panacea for Balochistan’s problems. In what could be an indicator for times to come, a string of development projects were announced on 2nd September by Nawaz Sharif — a dam, Gwadar Free Zone, Business Complex and a University. 

The more interesting question is: how will the MJC react? the MJC will definitely see India’s act as a provocation and will be considering a retaliation to shift the focus off Balochistan, particularly when it is on the rampage there. The distraction can come in the form of: a terrorist attack on the lines of Gurdaspur and Pathankot. Or in the form of heightened infiltration attempts in the Kashmir valley. Internally, there will be a campaign to highlight that the discontent in Balochistan is a result of Indian intelligence agencies. One can also expect the MJC to bring Kulbhushan Jadhav back into the zeitgeist.

Regardless of the two reactions aimed against India, India’s pitch for the Baloch cause will have significant repercussions on the internal power play between MJC and the civilian leadership. And in the current scenario, the MJC will start with momentum in its favour. This is because a strong, shared culture is a cornerstone of the MJC—a powerful force that keeps the various nodes together. And perhaps the most important feature of this shared culture is a deep-seated antagonism towards India. With a wider set of options, covert and overt, available at hand, the MJC is always in a better position to project itself as the true protector against evil designs of the Indian state. 

The internal power struggle gets further convoluted when one brings into account the impending change of guard at the helm of the military, in two months time. While Nawaz Sharif would want to project that he’s in charge, the Indian angle in Balochistan will play to the advantage of the Pakistani military in particular. The next two months will help us gauge how the Balochistan issue affects civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Finally, a reaction there will be from the MJC. The question is, is the Indian government prepared to manage the consequences of MJC’s retaliation? Answering this question is critical for calculating the true costs or benefits of India’s escalation on Balochistan.

Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas) is a Research Fellow at the Takshashila Institution.

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Rebel No Longer

India’s stance on nuclear norms is changing in order to keep up with the trends of the time.

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

Until 2010, India was the norm breaker of international nuclear negotiations. However, the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal saw India take a different approach to nuclear negotiations. Now, in order to gain access to nuclear fuel and technology, India is lobbying hard to be a part of export control regimes. This endeavour is just a step for India to become part of the international rule-making mechanisms on nuclear issues.

During the early years of the Cold War and its existence as a new democracy, India vociferously supported the cause of nuclear disarmament. As national security was the primary objective of India’s grand strategy, and nuclear weapons could lead to mass destruction, a nuclear weapon free world was a moral but also realist stance. Jawaharlal Nehru famously called for a standstill agreement on nuclear testing. However, as negotiations underway for a non-proliferation agreement, India found the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) discriminatory and unbalanced towards countries that had not detonated a nuclear device. India did not sign the NPT and the succeeding Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) because of the lack of commitment towards disarmament.

India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 and finally its nuclear test in 1998 both faced criticism at the global stage. The PNE spurred the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which aimed at reducing proliferation through the implementation of restrictions on nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. The control of supply of nuclear fuel and technology left India to indigenously develop technology for its nuclear programme. The 1998 tests faced sanctions from the United States and Japan and huge global outcry that India was “nuclearising” South Asia.

Since the 2005 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal however, India has changed its position gradually. The India-specific waiver by the NSG to engage in nuclear trade and commerce meant that India’s proliferation record were taken cognisance of.  India has also made efforts to be seen as a responsible power committed to non-proliferation. It harmonised its export control lists along the lines of international norms and has made sure that its non-proliferation track record is impeccable.

Recently, India attempted to gain membership in the NSG and the MTCR -the latter proved successful while the former is proving to be a formidable diplomatic task. India has also been an active participant of the Nuclear Security Summit, the most relevant forum for negotiating nuclear affairs currently. India’s attempt is to become part of the rule making mechanism rather than act as a rule-breaker. This would ensure India becomes an integral player in the future nuclear discourse. This is important because of India’s unique nuclear programme- uncomparable with any other in the world.

India is no longer rebelling against the international nuclear norms. This is also a result of the changing dynamics of the nuclear debate. Non-proliferation is not the main agenda anymore; the discourse is moving towards counter-proliferation, anxieties over nuclear security and nuclear terrorism. As India is trying to establish itself  a responsible nuclear power as it shares the concerns of the other countries in the world. To this end, the way is within nuclear security architecture and not outside it.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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