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Locating the paradiplomacy of Indian states

Currently, the space for Indian states to play a role in foreign policy is largely in the economic realm.

One of the growingly popular frameworks to analyse how sub state actors can play a role in foreign policy is paradiplomacy. According to Adam Grydehoj, paradiplomacy is a political entity’s extra-jurisdictional activity targeting foreign political entities.

Andre Lecours looks at how states participate in foreign policy in Europe and North America. He believes that they participate in three layers based on their geopolitical aims or behavior.

Political Issues of Paradiplomacy- Andrew Lecours

Political Issues of Paradiplomacy- Andrew Lecours

Lecours believes that paradiplomacy has been successful only because states have constitutionally granted powers to work in the foreign policy space. They have then proceeded to set up mechanisms by which states can play bigger roles in international relations. Belgium which is one of the best example of sub-state diplomacy provides all its regional actors with a veto on matters pertaining to international relations. Canada has set up communication and sectoral channels (so that the sub state authorities can approach relevant departments or ministries, share information and coordinate) apart from specific bodies devoted to bringing all domestic stakeholders on the table to discuss relevant international policies.

However, it will not be possible for all countries to follow this sort of paradiplomacy. Lecours acknowledges that in developing countries, sub nationalism may threaten sovereign identity or even result in the lack of national coherence. Therefore, paradiplomacy is viewed with suspicion by developing countries which generally have unitary governments.

Debates about participation of states in foreign policy eventually lead to debates on federalism. The Indian Constitution has placed foreign affairs (all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country) in the Union List. The Central Government also has sole authority over diplomatic, consular and trade representation, war and peace, foreign jurisdiction, citizenship, extradition and so on. This has structurally left the states little space to intervene in policy issues.

Any discussion about states in foreign policy in India goes back to how regional parties have pressured the Centre- with Tamil Nadu and West Bengal as the primary examples. States with land or sea borders have interacted beyond the Indian subcontinent much before Independence. Therefore, they have a natural interest in foreign policy. Since liberalization, states have started looking beyond the Union Government for sources for revenue. An overwhelming number of states now organize a Global Investor’s Summit to woo foreign investors. As I have argued earlier, states are also stepping up their game on NRI affairs because the importance of remittances has grown.

If we try to look at Indian states in Lecours’ layers, then it becomes immediately evident that states fall under the first layer in some capacities. Some states have actively pursued foreign investment to boost the state economy. The most striking example, of course, is the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh state under Chandrababu Naidu who actively courted investments in a bid to convert Hyderabad to the IT capital of the country. Telangana has recently come into the news for wooing large international companies like Amazon, Uber, Ikea and Apple to set up offices in the state.

Few states fall under the second layer. Tamil Nadu has held ‘World Tamil Conferences’ to reach out to Tamil Speakers and enthusiasts all over the world at regular intervals. While cultural associations emphasizing regional identity like the Kerala Sangam have been set up, these are non-profit initiatives set up by diaspora in various parts of the world.

The third layer is interesting because it is representative of why the Union Government would like to have authority over foreign policy. As India is an amalgamation of regional identities, the emphasis on political distinctness does not bode well for a coherent foreign policy. However, even this form of paradiplomacy has few takers simply because States see it as an infringement of their sovereignty.

India, states will increasingly pursue paradiplomacy for economic issues. While Lecours’ model may work well for developed countries, Indian states will find a way to maneuver foreign policy with the help of the centre. After all, the aim of foreign policy is to further India’s national interests which states also share.

This post is the part of a series of blogposts on ‘States in Foreign Policy’.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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Nadaan Parindey, ghar aaja

Kerala, Gujarat and Punjab show that states can play an important role in diaspora relations.

States are increasingly reaching out to their diaspora

States are increasingly reaching out to their diaspora

States are maneuvering around foreign policy considerations by reaching out to Non Resident Indians (NRIs). Foreign Policy is considered the domain of the Union Government however, some state government have proved adept at working around this by focusing on selected areas of outreach. One of the primary ways that states play a role in foreign policy is by reaching out to diaspora. As NRIs are an important source of remittances to the states, the states benefit from solving the issues faced by NRIs. States are also better poised to engage with diaspora as they have direct links with them and can devote more resources than the Union to deal with issues. One of the ways in some which states have done this is by forming a public sector undertaking which can work with relatively more freedom than the state administration itself.

More and more states have begun to institutionalise NRI relations through specific departments, divisions or boards. The states with the most developed institutional structures are Kerala, Punjab and Gujarat. These three states that stand out are not surprising given that they have huge diaspora spread out in different parts of the world. The states have tailormade their policies according to the interests of the diaspora which allows them flexibility and innovation.

Institutions dealing with diaspora relations in Kerala

The State Government of Kerala has expressly looked at institutionalizing administrative processes with respect to the interest of non-resident Keralites (NRKS) through a department called Non-Resident Keralites’ Affairs Department (NORKA). However the real work is done by a PSU established under the Department called NORKA ROOTS. Kerala which receives the highest remittances in the country has been working on making its diaspora employable from arranging pre-departure orientations, easy authentication of certificates, skills upgradation programme, financial assistance, rehabilitation projects for returnees, job portal, travel assistance etc.

Institutions dealing with diaspora relations in Gujarat

On the other hand Gujarat has set up an NRI division under the General Affairs Division which merely allocates funds and decides the composition of the Non-Resident Gujarati Foundation (A Government of Gujarat Undertaking). The NRGF looks at how NRIs can play a vital role within the state and has set up district committees for NRIs in every district to deal with any problems, to provide financial aid to the Gujarat Samaj, create a database of NRGs etc.

Institutions dealing with diaspora relations in Punjab

The NRI Affairs Department in Punjab has an intensive mandate from coordinating with the Home Ministry, liaising with NGOs, providing grants and waivers for NRI investment, focusing on twinning of cities such as Derby with Kapurthala and Jalandhar with the Borough of Hounslow, cultural exchanges etc. Punjab has gone a step further and allowed NRIs to vote in state elections (though they have to return to India to cast their votes).

There are some common strands across the policies of these three states such as the outreach to diaspora, creation of databases, grievance addressal and encouraging investment. The state governments of Kerala and Punjab have set up NRI cells under the respective police (though for Punjab, this has been upgraded into an NRI wing with cells in every district). While Gujarat has not set up similar institutions, it has set up an NRI cell under the State Women’s Commission to deal with complaints related to harassment of women abroad. While the grievances of the NRIs generally fall under the Home Ministry, the states have ensured their own jurisdiction by making BRI grievances a law and order issue pertinent to the state.

All the three states have also focused on issue identity cards to NRIs. The issue of cards such as Non-resident Keralite, Non-Resident Gujarati and Non-Resident Punjabi pushes for the sub-national identity which has generally subsumed under the larger Indian visa. This also reinforces the regional identity of the NRI and gives them a stake in the domestic affairs of the state.

States working in diaspora relations is a crucial and overlooked part of foreign policy. Increasingly, states have started looking to their diaspora for several reasons. Even states with relatively smaller diaspora such as Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have started engaging with diaspora so that they can be important stakeholders of the state. The role played by states in diaspora relations is an important one because it eases some of the burden that the Union bears in dealing with all these problems. It also acts as a bridging mechanism between NRIs and the Central Government. Other states in India should also consider similar mechanisms (or those more contextualized to its needs) so that they can tap into the advantages of their residents in a globalised world.

This post is the first of a series of blogposts on ‘States in Foreign Policy’.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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The Trumping of Marrakech

The 22nd Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCC negotiations at Marrakech have barely been in the mainstream Indian news simply because it is hard to find the media space between the withdrawal of the Rs.500 and Rs.1000 notes and the U.S Presidential elections. The COP 22 negotiations were to represent the optimism of a hard fought climate deal and design the implementation strategy for the Paris Deal. However, they have been largely overshadowed in light of contemporary geopolitics.

On November 4th, the outcome of the 2015 Paris negotiations came to fruition as 176 countries (the largest number to sign an international instrument since UNCLOS) deposited their instruments of signature at the United Nations. India had jumped on the bandwagon by ratifying the climate deal on the symbolic date of Gandhi Jayanti.

Multilateral negotiations for the climate deal saw India change its stance from a disrupter to a norm follower- a stance it has echoed in other multilateral negotiations including nuclear proliferation and the WTO negotiations. India had resolutely refused to sign any climate deals that did not involve Western nations in pulling their weight. Indian diplomats had claimed that in order to allow their citizens dignity of life through economic development, they could not commit to energy cut back of the scale required and insisted that countries responsible for the emissions take the lead.

However, this was not a viable position for long. Once China, the world’s largest contributor to carbon emissions joined with the US to cut down on emissions, India would have found its disruptive stance an even more unpopular and isolated position. India has shifted its stance and declared its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). However India’s new stance also stresses on its reliance on the rest of the world in bridging its energy needs through technology and help. Over the last year, steps have also been taken within the country to support its stance at the COPs. By streamlining its civil aviation rules and signing the CFC cutdown treaty, India has shown its willingness in combating climate change.

However, all of that now stands to change. The biggest shadow over the Marrakech COP is the US Presidential elections. While hyperbole has shown anti-Trump supporters protesting even at Marrakech, Donald Trump’s record on climate change shows little promise. He has repeatedly dismissed climate change and global warming as hoaxes and even gone on record to state that climate change was a conspiracy pioneered by the Chinese to reducing American manufacturing potential. Trump has stated that he would roll back the Paris Agreement. But speculation about Trump’s potential climate policy will lead us down a road that goes nowhere.

The Paris Agreement was ratified by President Obama on the sidelines of the G20 summit. In a show of US-China alignment, leaders of both countries deposited the Paris deal together is Hangzhou. The Paris Agreement also does not allow countries to withdraw from it for a period of three years. Therefore, there is little danger of Trump rolling back the Paris deal.

However, it is important to remember that INDCs are, at the end of the day, voluntary mechanisms based on good faith. They are non enforceable and bear little penalties in international law though the effects of climate change may seem apparent to everyone but Trump supporters. What is possible is that Trump will not prioritise the INDCs or fund the Clean Energy Plan, the brainchild of the Obama Administration. This is particularly important in terms of signalling for other countries. Countries like Saudi Arabia whose economies depend on conventional sources of energy could take the lethargy of the United States as a signal to disregard the Paris Deal. This would mean that the hard won negotiations of the last seven years have come to nought. Trump’s disregard for climate change will also stir the Chinese to take the lead on the issue. Already, Chinese officials have stated that they are committed to their climate change declarations despite political changes in other countries. China has also set up its national carbon emission trading market and has reportedly reduced its carbon intensity by 20% between 2011 and 2015.

What does this mean for India? India directly faces the effects of climate change as much of its agriculture is contingent on the monsoons. It has shifted its stance from norm disrupter to norm follower as a way to break out of the climate chakravyuh. However, if the United States will not stick to its INDC and China will, which path will India choose? Several commentators are already questioning India’s stance considering its close ties with the US. However, a comprehensive definition of security would require India to stick to its INDCs as the country is vulnerable to the effects of climate change. India needs to exercise its strategic autonomy and continue with tackling its INDCs.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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SAARC: A Sunk Cost

Following the Uri Attacks, the 19th SAARC Summit that was due to take place on the 15th and 16th of November has been postponed. India refused to attend the summit, placing the blame on cross border terrorism perpetrated by a single country. Soon, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan also chose to opt out of the summit meeting which was due to take place next month. Pakistan placed the blame on India for derailing processes of regional cooperation and reiterated its commitment to the SAARC charter. For now however, the seven heads of South Asia will not be meeting until India and Pakistan have simmered down tensions.

The Indian media has been quick to attribute the postponement of the SAARC meeting to the success of Modi’s diplomacy. However, SAARC meetings have always been susceptible to bilateral tensions. While the group is supposed to meet annually, it concedes that the regional organisation meets only once in a year and a half or so. No wonder SAARC’s initiatives have been characterised by failure: the countries cannot fulfill commitments to meet but intermittently.

The first time the SAARC Summit was derailed was in 1989 when Sri Lanka protested against the delay of the IPKF’s withdrawal from the country. The 7th Summit in 1992 was pushed by a year because of the Babri Masjid riots. A year later, India-Pakistan contentions impacted SAARC processes and the 8th Summit was pushed to 1995. The period between 1998 and 2003 saw repeated postponement of the 11th Summit because of a number of low intensity conflicts between India and Pakistan (from the Kargil War in 1999 to the Parliament Attacks of 2001). The 12th Summit was derailed because of the coup in Nepal and the Dhaka bombings.  After the 26/11 Attacks, the summit was again pushed by a year because of contentions between India and Pakistan. 2012 Summit

The postponement of the SAARC Summit is not a victory of Indian diplomacy but a feature of the SAARC mechanism. Unlike organisations like the ASEAN which have managed to keep channels of communication open even during times of conflict, SAARC’s history remains intertwined with the Indo-Pak power politics. It is unable to accomodate power dynamics of the region and allows for bilateral contentions to easily derail any processes. Even if the SAARC summit had taken place, what would have the result been? SAFTA is dead while the South Asian Economic Union is a pipe dream; regional trade remains at a meagre percentage.

At the 2014 Kathmandu Summit, hullabaloo was created about the launch of a SAARC satellite and cooperation of forces to deal with disasters. The Kathmandu Summit had taken place in the first year of the Modi rajya and there was much talk of the neighbourhood gaining importance- a move indicated by Modi’s unprecedented invitation to the heads of South Asian States to attend his swearing in ceremony. Two years later, bilateral ties between India and the remainder of the South Asian states (the case of Pakistan is debateable) are definitely on the upswing, however, the SAARC remains as ineffective as it has always been.

India needs to acknowledge that this multilateral initiative is not a success and direct its attentions towards the external neighbourhood. It needs to de-hyphenate itself from being merely a South Asian power and look at a larger region such as the Indo-Pacific. India is gradually improving ties with countries in South-East Asia and West Asia, which is the way to go. Maybe it is time to recognise that SAARC is a sunk cost and invest those resources in a more fruitful venture under the larger Asian security architecture.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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Coastal Security in India: An Apprisal

Little attention is provided to India’s sea borders which are a huge source of vulnerability. Over the past years, efforts to secure India’s coasts have stepped up but are they adequate?

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

As a peninsular country, India has a vast coastline of 7516 km making it vulnerable to various threats from the sea. However, coastal security is overlooked in our national security dialogue, which is overly continental in nature. The 1993 Mumbai blasts revealed that the explosives had been smuggled through the Raigad coast of Maharashtra. The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks also revealed loopholes in Indian coastal security. Smuggling of drugs and contraband, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), and flow of migrants from neighbouring countries are other variables that underscore the need for coastal protection.

History of Coastal Security Reform

Since Independence, India’s threats were seen as emanating from the land borders and little attention was devoted to the threats from the sea. Historically, India’s coastal states have a rich mercantile history whose routes remain unchanged. These also provide challenges emanating from smuggling, trafficking, illegal migration, infiltration and IUU fishing. The channels used for smuggling and trafficking are the same for security threats and terrorism. The Coast Guard was set up in 1977 for surveillance purposes and gradually undertook duties of protection and assistance of fishermen, anti-smuggling operations (in conjunction with other enforcement agencies), and preservation of marine life and ensures that maritime laws are enforced.  The 1993 Mumbai blasts revealed that the explosives had been smuggled through the Raigad coast of Maharashtra. The Indian government’s attempts to resolve issues of coastal security started in the aftermath of the 1993 Mumbai blasts. It put in place a three tier structure which consisted of the Indian Navy, the Indian Coast Guard and a joint patrol comprised of personnel from the former two as well as from the state police, the customs department and other agencies.

In 2005, the Government instituted the Coastal Security Scheme to set coastal police stations, check posts, outposts and barracks, equipped with boats, jeeps and motorcycles. The costs of training the personnel and procuring the vehicles were borne by the state while the Centre provided funds for the other operations. The reforms were not enough to deter the terrorists who perpetrated the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks which exposed the loopholes in coastal security.

In 2011, Phase-II of the scheme began; it allocated approximately Rs. 1579 crore to the states for procuring boats and vessels, jetties and four wheelers , surveillance equipment, computer systems etc. In 2012, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) was set up along the coast to monitor maritime traffic.  The Navy created the Sagar Prahari Bal, a special cadre dedicated to Coastal Security comprising of more than a thousand personnel and a hundred fast interceptor aircrafts. In 2014, a permanent Joint Operations Centre was set up in order to coordinate between the various agencies. Since 2008, substantive efforts have been made to improve coastal security however, challenges, particularly those of co-ordination remain.

Current Challenges to Coastal Security

The problems of coastal security remain varied and complex and the Coastal Security Scheme is just the first step in addressing these concerns. An important issue is consolidation of various stakeholders who include, the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard, the Marine Police, Customs Department, Fisheries Department, Special Economic Zones, Lighthouses, personnel of Critical Infrastructure, on the coast, fishermen and residents. Bureaucratic wrangling has also resulted in multiplicity of authorities from the Union, the states as well as private actors. However, centralising the authority under a single entity is not the answer because it leads to a hierarchical structure in which decisionmaking is long drawn while security threats require quick decisions.

Coordination between these authorities is also a problem. For example, even though the Centre asked states to provide land and infrastructure to the Coast Guard in Kodibagh, the district administration remains reluctant to do so because of political pressure from the locals. Similarly, issuing of id cards to fishermen is an important issue but keeping track of the fishermen and those who lend boats or dhows to others has also proven to be a challenge.

The establishment of marine police stations was thought to mitigate several of the on ground threats. However, the setting up of marine police stations has been slow because of states’ reluctance. In Odisha, for example, a CAG report discovered a shortage of manpower, lack of interceptor boats, no infrastructure and poor training of marine police personnel. This tussle between the states and the centre is a recurrent theme the debates on failing coastal security. States often cite the inadequacy of resources as one of the largest impediments to implementation of the coastal security initiatives. However, it is the states that bear the brunt of lapse of security, therefore, it is not an issue that can be allowed to rest lightly.

One of the biggest challenges in coastal security is that of a free-rider problem. While all the stakeholders agree that coastal security is an extremely important issue, no one of them want to bear the expenses that arise. Pushpita Das argues that states prefer the creation of Central Marine Police Force as it will lessen the burden imposed on the state to provide manpower to the marine police. Indeed, the fiscal burden of coastal security is currently, ompletely being borne by the Central Government. The multi-stakeholder problems therefore, require a comprehensive understanding of the fiscal allocation behind various scheme and innovative solutions to the same.

Another challenge is the role of technology in coastal security. Only after the Mumbai Attacks, there was a cognisance of the need to secure coasts at par with border outposts. Coastal radar systems, sensors and electronic surveillance systems have onlybeen installed over the last five years to monitor maritime traffic. In this light, there is a need to see how technology can be used innovatively in coastal security.

The challenges to India’s coastal security are plenty. While terrorism has proven the most potent threat over the last few years, a whole range of issues ranging from migration to smuggling have plagued Indian coasts. The need of the hour is a comprehensive review of the vulnerabilities and threats arising from the sea. Only then, can successful solutions be sought.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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East Asia Summit: An exhibit of Asian institutionalism

The EAS displays few concrete results and this is a problem that is symptomatic of most multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. 

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

The 11th East Asian Summit (EAS) concluded last week after adopting declarations related to infrastructure development, migratory flows and non proliferation. The Summit which brought together 18 Heads of State made headlines more for the bilateral meetings held rather than the outcomes of the summit itself. For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also attended the 14th ASEAN-India Summit and held meetings with Shinzo Abe, Barack Obama, Li Keqiang, Dmitry Mendvedev, Aung Sun Suu Ki, Park Geun-hye, Thongloun Sisoulith amongst others. India brought up issues of terrorism financing, the RCEP and India’s membership into APEC as well as India’s position on the South China Sea. However, there were few other takeaways.

The evolution the EAS has been coloured by ineffectual meetings and bland rhetoric. The East Asian Summit has its roots in the regional institutionalism pioneered by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, ASEAN attempted to spearhead new security architecture for Asia. The basis for this was the ASEAN+ X format. In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed. In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the ASEAN+3 included Japan, China and South Korea to catalyse the processes of regionalism. This expanded into the ASEAN+6 as it was widened to include Australia, New Zealand and India. Eventually, it admitted Russia and the United States and this grouping came to be known as the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS was to serve as the precursor for a larger East Asian Community built along the same lines as a European Community.

One of the main contentions about the EAS during its formation was its membership. China was keen to limit membership to East Asian countries alone and was hesitant to allow India and Australia into the group for fears of dilution. However, membership continued to increase and the EAS is one of the avenues where leaders are brought to discuss issues of regional scope having wide ranging impact.

Institutionalism in Asia has been weak and built with the explicit to keep it that way. Unlike the formal, majority decisionmaking structures illustrated by the European Union and other regional institutions elsewhere in the world, institutions in Asia prefer an informal, consensus based approach. The best example of this is the ASEAN whose style of negotiations have been described as ‘The ASEAN Way’. Supporters laud ASEAN’s processes while realists discard it as an effectual talkshop. While ASEAN’s merits and demerits as an organisation have been espoused and contested, it remains one of the few, functioning regional institutions in Asia.

Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region has not been successful either in the economic or the security spheres. One reason is the lack of desire of states, who are generally suspicious of regimes that would take away their strategic autonomy. However, the excessive focus on inclusivity and soft regionalism, dialogue and consensus mean that the EAS currently agrees on very little. Characterised by geopolitics and rising contentions in the Asia-Pacific, the loopholes of institutions in fostering cooperation is becoming more apparent than ever. Meanwhile, multilateral institutions allow for corridor diplomacy and declarations of commitment. How far this will go in socialising countries into regional or global norms is yet to be seen.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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Don’t Hold Your Breath for the G-20

The G-20 Summit this weekend will see world leaders descend upon Hangzhou. How much will be accomplished considering the G-20 has been meandering since 2010?

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

Over the last few months, Chinese media has depicted the G-20 Hangzhou Summit as a major upcoming milestone in global governance. Media Reports claim that the Summit’s agenda includes issues ranging from global taxation, innovation, growth, investment, climate change, trade barriers to even anti-corruption. How much will the G-20 be able to deliver on?

The Answer: very little.

It will do us well to question what the G-20 has actually achieved in the last six years. It was the primary coordinating agency after the 2008 Financial Crisis and came up with the standstill policy. At the 2010 Seoul Summit, there was a 6% quota rebalancing to emerging countries in the composition of the executive board of the IMF. The 2011 and 2012 Summits were overshadowed by the Eurozone Crisis. At the Cannes Summit, it was suggested that the IMF would provide additional financing to Europe as a whole rather than a single country. Japan led the pack with 60 billion dollars while the BRICS countries followed suit but the US remained aloof from the efforts. In 2013, the G-20 for the first time, addressed political contentions, particularly the Syrian civil war and the use of chemical weapons. In 2014, the Brisbane Summit saw leaders pledge to lift GDP by 2% by 2018. However, there is little evidence to prove that most countries are departing from their national policies to meet their commitments. The 2015 Agenda simply reiterated the need for meeting past commitments.

Thus, broadening of its agenda beyond international financial reform has also meant that the G-20 has had little impact on anything. The counter argument is that the G20 is a deliberative body rather than a decision making one. However, the purpose of deliberations is to drive decisionmaking at some level. The G-20 always possessed a feature of complementarity: it was to work alongside other major international institutions. However, reform of international institutions has proven to be a long arduous task and the G-20’s assumption of other tasks (comparable to the agenda of multiple other international institutions) will bear little fruit.

The main problem with the G-20 is that it is unable to deal with the power politics amongst its members. Given the unanimity requirement in the organisation, an issue is pushed off the agenda if there is a considerable opposition from several G-20 members forming an issue specific coalition. Agenda Setting dynamics within the G-20 generally pit developing and developed countries against each other. On the other hand, China which is the global growth engine and the US, still the global superpower, both seek to dominate the G-20 agenda. This is addition to individual countries attempting to carve out special deals for themselves. This cacophony of voices is one of the reasons that the G-20 has failed to deliver.

The G-20 is important for corridor diplomacy however, G-20’s importance boiling down to corridor diplomacy cannot be regarded as a success in any sense of the term. The main problem with the G-20 was that it was a minilateral envisioned to have taken the most important powers into consideration for effective deliberation. However, this minilateral is not small enough to align nations’ strategies and is beset by concerns of national interest.  The 2016 G-20 agenda is too wide a net for any effective outcomes. The only way forward is for the G-20 to prioritise its most important issues and stick to its original mandate: answering systemic economic challenges.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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India’s Stance on Export Control Regimes

An analysis of India’s positioning towards various Multilateral Export Control Regimes displays a trend of norm creation- norm adherence and agenda setting.

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

India has low reserves of uranium required for its civil nuclear energy programmes. While India has been attempting self reliance in the field by substituting thorium as the primary nuclear fuel in its three stage nuclear cycle, it still suffers from lack of uranium in its reactors. India would also benefit from nuclear technology that it did not have access to during the Cold War because of its isolated road to self sufficiency.

India did not sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and detonated a nuclear device, ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ outside the NPT norms in 1974. Restitution was quick as the London Club (which then became the Nuclear Suppliers Group) was formed in order to restrict nuclear supply only to countries that have signed the NPT. India relied on indigenously built nuclear facilities for the next three decades until it tested its nuclear device in 1998. India faced harsh criticism for the tests and countries like Japan and the United States even imposed sanctions on the country. However, the world’s opposition to India’s nuclear stance was to change. In 2005, the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal was a pathbreaking deal as it changed the US approach towards India’s nuclear programme. This was instrumental in providing India with an NSG waiver in 2008. India was to be considered a defacto nuclear power and allowed to trade with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In 2010, the Indo-US Joint Statement outlined India’s case for multilateral export control regimes (MECRs). Since then, India has taken intensive efforts to synchronise its export control mechanism with those of different regimes.

While the MECRs all focus on curtailing the supply of sensitive technology, India has focused on improving its own proliferation record, by streamlining its export controls with those of various international regimes. The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act No. 22 of 1992 or FTDR is the principal legal basis for India’s strategic trade control system. The Indian government uses its own export control list known as the Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment, and Technologies (SCOMET) list. It has also identified some groups as being more important than others: Currently, the diplomatic efforts are geared towards the NSG and the MTCR because entry into the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group both hold entry into the former groups as a precursor.

The following is an analysis of various export groups and India’s relationship with them:

Name of Export Control Regime Nuclear Suppliers Group
Stated Aim of the Regime “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of restrictions on nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.”
India’s Position Applied to NSG on May 10, 2016.

India has been keenest on NSG membership because the 48 member group contains supply of nuclear fuel. The NSG was formed in the aftermath of the Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, and was one of the instruments used to isolate India in the nuclear domain. In 2008, it did provide India a clean waiver to allow it to engage in nuclear commerce. However in 2011, the NSG went back on its 2008 India- specific waiver by instituting new guidelines. The implications of the new guidelines are that it has made the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even stronger and wants India to join the Treaty.

India’s membership to the NSG is thus important because it allows India to be a part of future norm making in the nuclear domain. As geopolitics always trumps international law, it is possible that the rules of the group can be changed in the future. By being within the rulemaking mechanism, India can ensure that the norms are aligned with its national interests.

 

Name of Export Control Regime Missile Technology Control Regime
Stated Aim of the Regime “Voluntary partnership to curb the spread of delivery systems, particularly proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of carrying a 500 kg payload for at least 300 km.”
India’s Position Acceded to MTCR in 2016

The main benefit of the MTCR is that it controls missile technology, particularly drone technology that India could potentially gain access to. India’s Brahmos missile, made in conjunction with Russia has a range of 290 km, just under the limit of the MTCR. In the 1990s, the MTCR had protested against the sale of Russian cryogenic engines to India as it supposedly flouted group norms (Russia was a part of the MTCR) and put political pressure until the sale was dropped. Joining the MTCR could prevent similar political pressure against technology transfer. However, an important caveat is that missile technology transfer does not depend on the MTCR alone. Member Countries have traded despite flouting MTCR norms as they are voluntary and non-conforming. Therefore, India does not necessarily need to be part of it to conduct trade but it does add to its political capital.

 

Name of Export Control Regime Wassenaar Arrangement
Stated Aim of the Regime “Promotes transparency of national export control regimes on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.”
India’s Position India has been streamlining its SCOMET list with the Wasenaar Arrangement

Members of the Wassenaar Arrangement have to maintain rigorous national export control systems and have to be members of or be acting in accordance with the NPT, MTCR, CWC, and the UN Register of Conventional Arms. While the group is said to be easier to gain membership than some of the other export control regimes, India is looking to gain membership only after it gains entry into the NSG and the MTCR. India has been streamlining its SCOMET list, its FTDR and also passed the WMD Act in 2005. Membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement presents one less political hurdle in getting access to sensitive technology. It is important for India’s soft power to be seen as a responsible exporter of technology.

Name of Export Control Regime Australia Group
Stated Aim of the Regime “Through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons”
India’s Position India became a dialogue partner in 2015

The Australia Group looks at harmonization of international export controls on chemical weapons precursor chemicals. As India’s chemical and biotechnology industries grow in size and stature, being a member of the Australia Group would provide India’s commercial ventures with political legitimacy as well. However, it has few other benefits.

 

Name of Export Control Regime Arms Trade Treaty
Stated Aim of the Regime “To prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end useand end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts.”
India’s Position India abstained from signing the Treaty in 2013

While India was an integral part of negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty, it did not sign the treaty because India’s sovereign right to trade in arms could be impinged by the regime. It also wanted stronger action on illegal arms trade. It also contends that the ATT limits itself to arms sales rather than transfers which creates an inherent loophole for countries to take advantage of. India is the largest importer of arms in the world and is thus, any treaty on arms trade need to take the country into consideration. Illicit arms trade, particularly in the neighbourhood is a worrying factor and the Arms Trade treaty is an important step in regulating it. However, unless the Treaty is made stronger in essence, it will not be in India’s national interest to sign it.

 

Name of Export Control Regime Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Stated Aim of the Regime “To exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”
India’s Position Signed the CWC on 14 January 1993 and ratified it in 1996

India has been an active proponent of the CWC and in 2009, it became the third country to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons. While India has been accused by Pakistan of using chemical weapons, the accusations did not bear fruit. Indeed, India’s chemical industry is expansive and India has demonstrated its intent to be a part of counter proliferation of chemical weapons by aiding the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

An analysis of India’s participation at various multilateral export control regimes shows India’s proactive efforts in being perceived as a responsible nuclear player. India has been an integral part of the norm creation process by participating in negotiations. However, it does not enter into treaties or join organisations which do not comply with its core interests such as the Arms Trade Treaty. On the other hand, even if India lies outside the regimes, it has followed international norms either by passing domestic laws such as the WMD Act of 2005 or setting up its SCOMET. Now, India is using its position to be join regimes which will provide it a seat at the agenda setting table. In this way, it will make sure that the norm making mechanisms in the future will be in conjunction with India’s national interests.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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Rebel No Longer

India’s stance on nuclear norms is changing in order to keep up with the trends of the time.

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

Until 2010, India was the norm breaker of international nuclear negotiations. However, the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal saw India take a different approach to nuclear negotiations. Now, in order to gain access to nuclear fuel and technology, India is lobbying hard to be a part of export control regimes. This endeavour is just a step for India to become part of the international rule-making mechanisms on nuclear issues.

During the early years of the Cold War and its existence as a new democracy, India vociferously supported the cause of nuclear disarmament. As national security was the primary objective of India’s grand strategy, and nuclear weapons could lead to mass destruction, a nuclear weapon free world was a moral but also realist stance. Jawaharlal Nehru famously called for a standstill agreement on nuclear testing. However, as negotiations underway for a non-proliferation agreement, India found the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) discriminatory and unbalanced towards countries that had not detonated a nuclear device. India did not sign the NPT and the succeeding Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) because of the lack of commitment towards disarmament.

India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 and finally its nuclear test in 1998 both faced criticism at the global stage. The PNE spurred the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which aimed at reducing proliferation through the implementation of restrictions on nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. The control of supply of nuclear fuel and technology left India to indigenously develop technology for its nuclear programme. The 1998 tests faced sanctions from the United States and Japan and huge global outcry that India was “nuclearising” South Asia.

Since the 2005 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal however, India has changed its position gradually. The India-specific waiver by the NSG to engage in nuclear trade and commerce meant that India’s proliferation record were taken cognisance of.  India has also made efforts to be seen as a responsible power committed to non-proliferation. It harmonised its export control lists along the lines of international norms and has made sure that its non-proliferation track record is impeccable.

Recently, India attempted to gain membership in the NSG and the MTCR -the latter proved successful while the former is proving to be a formidable diplomatic task. India has also been an active participant of the Nuclear Security Summit, the most relevant forum for negotiating nuclear affairs currently. India’s attempt is to become part of the rule making mechanism rather than act as a rule-breaker. This would ensure India becomes an integral player in the future nuclear discourse. This is important because of India’s unique nuclear programme- uncomparable with any other in the world.

India is no longer rebelling against the international nuclear norms. This is also a result of the changing dynamics of the nuclear debate. Non-proliferation is not the main agenda anymore; the discourse is moving towards counter-proliferation, anxieties over nuclear security and nuclear terrorism. As India is trying to establish itself  a responsible nuclear power as it shares the concerns of the other countries in the world. To this end, the way is within nuclear security architecture and not outside it.

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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The G-20 Report Card

 The G-20 proved successful as a exigent mechanism post the 2008 Financial Crisis but hasn’t been able to provide solutions to global issues. The 2016 Summit in September will show if the grouping will become yet another defunct multilateral forum or if it can revitalise decisionmaking in the international system.

By Hamsini Hariharan (@HamsiniH)

In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the G-20 was thought to be the most effective institutional response to the crisis. Since then, the multilateral forum has been struggling to stay relevant to the changing geopolitics. Delivering more structural, longer-term solutions to create a more balanced global economy requires more far-reaching actions at domestic level, often needing the approval of national parliaments, which effectively makes advancing the G-20 agenda more difficult.[1] Since 2008, economic changes have been rapid and unpredictable. The Chinese reminbi was admitted into the SDR basket of currencies in 2015 but the Chinese economy in the same year went through a number of shocks and had to devalue its currency. Thus, China which hosting the 2016 Summit, faces a completely different context from the earlier years because of its own economic problems. The Summit, to be held in September 2016 will show if the grouping will become yet another defunct multilateral forum or if it can revitalise decisionmaking in the international system.

The G-20 is an interesting group for analysis on three different levels: On one hand, it shows the wrangling of the US which has been declining in stature in the international system, unable to cope with the pressures of the system unilaterally. On the other hand, it also sees the diplomatic maneuvering of China on an ascent, keen to reform the international system in its favour. The third level sees middle power countries around the world that are pushing for their own national interests as well as the agenda of developing countries.

The Group of Twenty was initiated in 1999 as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis on the suggestion of the G7: “the commitment to work together to establish an informal mechanism for dialogue among systemically important countries, within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system”.  The 2008 financial crisis exposed the fault lines in the global economic system particularly excessive bank credit, build up of private consumption based on uncollaterised loans and an inexorable rise in public debt. The group emerged partly as a result of political pressure on world leaders to ‘do something’ about the global financial crisis.  But it also was a response to the absence of international institutions where international coordination could take place quickly along a broad range of policy instruments.

The G 20 in the short term has achieved a status of one of the most important exigency contingents that allows for consensus building amongst powers of differing capabilities.  In the medium term, the G-20 could reflect and (possibly even help manage) a major reorientation in the relative standing of the world’s major powers.

The G-20 was envisioned as a forum to deal with financial crises beyond the capacity of advanced Western states. However, it has been transformed into an arena for world politics to be played out. Different forces of agenda setting have been played out within the G 20. For one, an America reeling from the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis, initially set the agenda of the G-20 as the primary mechanism for crises management. However, the US has not been able to dictate processes or outcomes of the G-20.

China, as the rising power and expectant challenger to the power of the US, briefly aligned with the US. This led to fears of the two most powerful actors combining strategies to jointly dictate the agenda. However, China did not follow through with any sort of G 2 arrangement citing domestic concerns. G-20 is also the battlefield for developed countries grappling with the rise of emerging countries. While the G20 emerged as the major platform for global politics, the expansion of its agenda and its relevance amidst dynamic geopolitical and economic contexts in the future will determine its prospects.

The G-20 has other instrumental benefits, namely the formation of a new and updated concentration of power and has cross regional reach.  The growing strength of the G-20 as a forum however does not mean that G-20 decisions are effective. G-20 pessimists often cite lack of progress on curtailing currency wars and macroeconomic imbalances and repeatedly express disappointment over the outcome of the G-20 summits. Global governance, even with just twenty members and consensus based decision making, is an arduous task.

The G-20 demonstrates that in a multipolar world, emerging powers have to share the burden of leadership with great powers. However, it has realised very little since 2009 despite much talk. China’s assumption of presidency could provide the group with the push it needs to effect any major change. However, the agenda for discussions remains unclear thus making durable solutions to the problems of global governance implausible.

[1]  Marcin Szczepański and Etienne Bassot, “The Group of Twenty (G20): Setting the Global Agenda”,  European Parliamentary Research Service (Brussels: January 2015) p.8

Hamsini Hariharan is a Research Scholar with the Takshashila Institution and tweets at @HamsiniH

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